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In FY 2010, the Department of Defense (DoD) spent more than $210 billion on supply 
chain management.  However, the Government Accountability Office has identified DoD 
supply chain management as a high-risk area, specifically forecasting, asset visibility, and 
materiel distribution.  Additionally, the DoD has not developed the means to measure the 
effectiveness of implemented actions or defined root causes as they pertain to the 
warfighter.  The purpose of this study is to examine current supply chain practices and 
procedures within the Department of the Navy (DON).  The goal is to provide a baseline 
for comparing the in-transit shipping times of three shipping priority categories to 
identify potential problem areas within the DON logistics network, specifically within the 
Fifth Fleet area of operation (AOR).  Identifying potential weaknesses within the supply 
chain provides suggestions for further study to best identify cost effective ways to 
improve material movement, processes, and to increase the readiness of the warfighter. 
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In FY 2010, the Department of Defense (DoD) spent more than $210 Billion on 
logistics and supply chain management.  Yet long-standing weaknesses exist that result in 
DoD supply chain management being assessed as a “high risk” area by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011a).  The 
GAO identified three areas within DoD’s supply chain management that led to the poor 
assessment: requirements forecasting, asset visibility, and materiel distribution.  To 
remove supply chain management from the GAO’s list of high-risk areas, the DoD need 
to develop and implement specific corrective action plans that not only address identified 
weaknesses, but also set in place metrics and oversight processes that prevent those 
weaknesses from reappearing.  According to the GAO, the DoD has not developed plans 
that sufficiently meet these requirements (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 
2011b).  Specifically, although the DoD has developed plans for corrective actions, it has 
not developed a means to evaluate and measure the effectiveness of the implemented 
actions.  Additionally, the DoD has not effectively defined root causes or effective 
solutions as they pertain to the warfighter.  For instance, the Army has implemented a 
$2.6 billion Enterprise Resource Planning system to improve forecasting, but has not seen 
expected benefits due to data processing issues (GAO, 2011b).  Lack of reliable process 
and cost data was another area addressed in the GAO report, and contributed significantly 
to the high risk classification.  Without reliable process and cost data, even well thought 
out implementation plans carry greater risk.  
B. PURPOSE 
This study examines current supply chain practices and procedures within the 
Department of the Navy (DON).  The goal is to provide a baseline for in-transit shipping 
times for three shipping priority categories to identify potential problem areas within the 
DON logistics network within the Fifth Fleet Area of Operation (AOR).  Identifying 
potential weaknesses within the supply chain provides suggestions for areas of further 
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study to best identify cost effective ways to improve material movement practices and 
processes and to increase the readiness of the warfighter. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What variability exists in the supply chain from material shipping to the 
last geographic location of in transit visibility, and in the last nautical mile? 
2.  What are the relationships between the shipping times of different 
priorities within the two applicable segments of the supply chain? 
 
D. SUMMARY 
This study is divided into six chapters.  Chapter I describes the background and 
reason for the study, outlines the goals for the study, and gives the research questions.  
Chapter II reviews relevant literature.  Chapter III identifies the current supply chain into 
and through the Fifth Fleet AOR, clarifies applicable supply chain issues, and outlines the 
challenges and limitations faced by Department of Defense (DoD) logisticians.  Chapter 
IV describes the dataset and methodology used to answer the research questions.  Chapter 
V describes the data analysis performed.  Chapter VI provides conclusions based on the 
data analysis and recommendations for further study. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are scholarly aspects relevant to this study that should be reviewed.  Supply 
chain visibility is not only a priority for DoD but is extremely important for civilian 
sector businesses.  As a result numerous studies have been undertaken to understand and 
improve supply chain visibility practices.  Emergency logistics is an area that has not 
been as widely explored.  However, its dynamic environment parallels much of what the 
DoD sees in its operations.  Finally, last-mile delivery has become an increasingly 
important subject for the business world as companies attempt to distinguish themselves 
from their competitors.  While DoD does not have competitors, last-mile visibility proves 
to be the most challenging part of its supply chain.  The following sections delve into 
some of the most relevant research and articles on these topics. 
A.  SUPPLY CHAIN VISIBILITY 
GAO conducted a review of DoD Supply Chain Management and published its 
findings in January 2009.  They found that while DoD has produced several documents 
aimed at improving supply chain management, there were three areas in which this 
roadmap could be more effective.  The GAO recommended identifying gaps in logistics 
capabilities, establishing outcome-based performance objectives and defining who is 
responsible for and how integration of the roadmap with logistics decision-making 
processes would be accomplished.  Additionally, they acknowledged the promise of item 
unique identification (IUID) and radio frequency identification (RFID) technologies as 
possible ways to improve asset visibility (GAO, 2009). 
Research by Caridi, Crippa, Perego, Sianesi and Tumino (2010) used a model to 
quantify visibility and measure its effects on supply chain performance.  They found not 
only that increased visibility improves supply chain performance but also developed a 
method for managers to target low visibility areas (Caridi, Crippa, Perego, Sianesi & 
Tumino, 2010). 
Trebilcock (2010) discusses seven areas of supply chain management that have 
seen dramatic increases in visibility due to technological breakthroughs.  These areas are: 
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warehouse management systems, warehouse control systems, manufacturing execution 
systems, asset management, yard management systems, and, most relevant to this study, 
transportation management systems.  While he discusses how visibility affects 
businesses, his assertion that visibility effects operations is also relevant to DoD.  He also 
proposes that most recent innovations in supply chain management have been driven by 
visibility (Trebilcock, 2010). 
B. EMERGENCY LOGISTICS 
Banomyong and Sopadang (2010) developed a model as a conceptual framework 
for improving emergency logistics response.  They also developed a simulation to test 
their model against a real world scenario.  While acknowledging the limitations of their 
simulation, they believe their model can be a useful tool for logistics decision makers 
(Banomyong & Sopadang, (2010).  
In their research, Wei-hua, Xue-cai, Zheng-xu, and Peng (2011) use a 
mathematical model to examine an emergency order allocation mechanism in order to 
help managers understand and deal with problems in the case of an emergency.  
Implementation of their model in a practical setting has proven to be successful for a 
logistics company in China (Wei-hua, Xue-cai, Zheng-xu, & Peng, 2011). 
C. LAST MILE DELIVERY 
Boyer, Prud'homme, and Chung (2009) investigated the relationships customer 
density and delivery windows have on efficiency.  They found through use of a 
simulation that while increasing customer density and/or length of delivery windows 
increased efficiency, it did so at a decreasing rate.  This indicates that there is an optimal 
point between customer density or delivery window and efficiency (Boyer, Prud'homme, 
& Chung, 2009).  
O’Shea (2009) believes the last-mile is the most important but that companies 
place most of their attention at the beginning of their supply chains.  He regards the end 
of the supply chain as the most inefficient piece.  He concludes that investment in true 
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end-to-end visibility is what will distinguish successful companies from failures (O’Shea, 
2009).  Similarly, Cottrill (2000) discusses how successfully conquering the last-mile can 
make or break a company. 
Germain (2004) ties last-mile delivery to supply chain visibility.  He discusses the 
benefits of visibility including reduced cost, improved efficiency and increased access to 
actionable data for managers.  He also explains why, despite the benefits, companies are 
reluctant to implement it.  This, he notes, is due to perceived financial and operational 
risks faced by its implementation.  Managers cannot see a clear return on investment and 
adding additional pieces to already complicated supply chains could cause unneeded 
difficulties.  He concludes that these perceived risks are fictitious and implementation 
leads to opening up the last-mile (Germain, 2004). 
 6
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III. BACKGROUND 
A.  GENERAL INFORMATION 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) divides command and control 
responsibility into nine Combatant Commands.  Six of the Combatant Commands are 
geographical; three are functional.  At a minimum, each Combatant Command is divided 
into Service components.  This project focuses analysis on the supply chain that ends at 
U.S. Navy afloat units in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the Navy component of the 
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), the U.S. Fifth Fleet. 
USCENTCOM’s AOR roughly covers Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula (except 
Israel), western Asia (except Turkey), south of Russia and west of China and India, 
including the international waters of the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea (United States 
Central Command [USCENTCOM], n.d.).  See Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.  U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (From United States Central 
Command [USCENTCOM], n.d.) 
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Critical to the analysis of the Fifth Fleet supply chain is a thorough understanding 
of how material flows through the AOR.  This understanding must include the methods 
used to ship material into and throughout Fifth Fleet.  Additionally, identifying the points 
at which the material enters the area and intermediate stops before final delivery is 
integral to complete understanding the supply chain. 
In general, a supply chain can be thought of as a decision-making “cone.”  There 
are usually numerous options for moving material early; however, options typically 
decrease as the material approaches its final destination.  These decisions can be the 




Figure 2.  Supply Chain “Cone” 
B. U.S. FIFTH FLEET SUPPLY CHAIN 
1. Prearrival 
Material destined to the Fifth Fleet can originate at a manufacturer or a supply 
depot.  The material is moved from its origin to a distribution center for shipment to Fifth 
Fleet.  Few routing decisions are made with respect to where the material is shipped prior 
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to arrival in the AOR.  See Figure 3.  Unlike the “cone” model, in the Persian Gulf, most 
routing decisions are made in theater.  This is due to the fact that unit position and 
schedule is often fluid and operational planners in Fifth Fleet have access to the most 
current information.  In addition, security concerns make unit movements classified. 
Prior to being shipped by the Air Mobility Command (AMC), material is tagged 
with an active radio frequency identification (RFID) tag.  This material can be tracked 




Figure 3.  U.S. Fifth Fleet Supply Chain (From NAVSUP, 2011) 
2. Arrival in Fifth Fleet 
Broadly, material arrives into the AOR via military transport or world wide 
express (WWX).  Worldwide express is the DOD term for commercial shipping 
companies such as DHL or FedEx.  WWX shipments arrive daily.  Military transport into 
the theater can be broken down into airlift and sealift.  Airlift by AMC arrives up to three 
times per week.   Military sealift is very limited and occurs on a space available basis. 
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The main arrival point for AMC material is Bahrain in the Arabian Peninsula.  
Upon arrival at the Bahrain airport, material is sorted by end user at the airhead 
warehouse.  If the material requires further air transport, it will remain at the airhead 
warehouse.  Any other material is transported to the Navy operated warehouse near the 
Bahrain waterfront.  Material arriving by commercial sealift is usually delivered to Jebel 
Ali, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), however some material does get delivered to the 
commercial port in Bahrain.  Military sealift shipments are unloaded wherever the vessel 
makes its first port of call, usually Jebel Ali or Bahrain.  Most WWX material is 
delivered to Bahrain, however Jebel Ali, Fujairah, U.A.E., and to a limited extent, 
Djibouti in the Horn of Africa are also delivery points. 
3. In-Theater Movement 
Once in theater, CTF-53, the logistics arm of Fifth Fleet, takes over responsibility 
for transportation.  For intermediate movement, CTF-53 uses organic air assets or 
contracted commercial trucking to move material.  Their organic air assets include one C-
40 and one C-130.  This is the primary means of moving material.  The C-40 is a military 
version of the Boeing 737.  It has a range in excess of 3,100 nm while transporting 
40,000 lbs. of cargo (United States Navy [USN], 2009a).  See Figure 5.  The C-130 is an 




Figure 4.  C-130 Hercules (From USN, 2002) 
 
Figure 5.  C-40 Clipper (From USN, 2001) 
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Intermediate stops, those locations between initial arrival in the AOR and the end 
user, include Jebel Ali, Fujairah, Djibouti and Bahrain.  The straight-line distance from 
Bahrain to Fujairah is approximately 370 miles and Bahrain to Djibouti is approximately 
1113 miles (World Airport Codes, n.d.).  All of the aforementioned locations are 
equipped with R-GATES active RFID systems.  Material not actively tagged can be 
manually entered for tracking.  These intermediate stops represent the final time that in 
transit visibility (ITV) is currently available and the final time data is currently collected 
prior to the end user reporting material receipt. 
4. Final Delivery 
While final delivery is occasionally made directly to the end user while inport, 
most material arrives via Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD), Vertical Onboard Delivery 
(VOD)/ Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP) or by Military Sealift Command (MSC) 
Underway Replenishment (UNREP) ship.  This is commonly referred to the last nautical 
mile and is the terminal phase of the material’s journey. 
COD is a method of delivery where a fixed wing aircraft lands on an aircraft 
carrier to bring personnel, equipment or supplies.  Similarly, VOD delivers personnel, 
equipment or supplies by utilizing helicopters.  This method is used typically for ships 
other than aircraft carriers that are equipped with helicopter landing decks. 
UNREPs are broken down into two categories, connected replenishments 
(CONREP) and VERTREP.  A CONREP is two ships sailing approximately 150 feet 
abreast of one another along the same course and connected using high-tension steel 
cables.  A shuttle is mechanically pulled back and forth with pallets slung underneath the 
shuttle.  Hoses can also be attached to the cables to facilitate fuel delivery.  See Figure 6.  
Like VOD, VERTREP utilizes helicopters, however pallets are lifted externally from the 
supply ship to the customer vessel.  See Figure 9.  The customer ship does not need a 
helicopter landing deck to receive material via VERTREP.  Ships can conduct CONREP 















Figure 7.  Final Delivery Methods 
COD aircraft are C-2 Greyhounds which can (only) deliver directly to aircraft 
carriers.  The C-2 has a 1,300 nm range and a payload of 10,000 pounds (USN, 2009c).  
The helicopter the U.S. Navy uses for VOD and VERTREP aircraft is H-60, which can 
carry internal cargo or external loads.  The range of an H-60 is 380 nm, however 
operational regulations drastically reduce that range in practice. An H-60 can carry 2,600 
pounds internally or an external load up to 9,000 pounds (USN, 2009d).  While the 
external load capability of the H-60 approaches the capacity of the C-2, external loads are 
almost never carried more than half a mile.  The main drawback to the C-2 is the fact it is 
fixed wing and, as mentioned above can only land on a runway or aircraft carrier.  It also 
must be within range of an airfield, however this is less of a problem in the Fifth Fleet 
due to the geography. 
The UNREP ships are Fleet Oilers (T-AO), Fast Combat Support Ships (T-AOE) 
or Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ships (T-AKE).  See Figures 10, 11, and 12.  These “supply 
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ships” conduct CONREPs or, in the case of T-AOEs and T-AKEs, use embarked 
helicopter detachments for delivery (VOD/VERTREP).  Fleet Oilers are not capable of 




Figure 8.  C-2 Greyhound (From USN, 2004a) 
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Figure 9.  SH-60 Seahawk conducting VERTREP (From USN, 2004b) 
The MSC ships load material in Bahrain, Jebel Ali, Fujairah or Djibouti.  Units in 
the Arabian Gulf are replenished every six to eight days.  In the Red Sea, units patrolling 
UNREP with supply ships every eight to ten days.  Ships in the Northern Arabian Sea 
and Gulf of Oman receive supplies every seven to ten days.  Units operating off the Horn 
of Africa are on a ten to fifteen day replenishment cycle. 
Once the end user receives material, the receipt is manually processed and 
reported to the supply system. 
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Figure 10.  Fleet Oiler (T-AO) (From USN, 2004c) 
 











Figure 12.  Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship (T-AKE) (From Military Sealift Command 
[MSC), n.d.) 
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The data in this study were provided by the NAVSUP Logistics Operations 
Center, a level III echelon command under the Naval Supply Systems Command 
(NAVSUP).  The NAVSUP Logistics Operations Center is the NAVSUP service 
provider for transportation, ordnance, and logistics planning coordination.  The data 
includes six months of requisition and shipping data for all afloat assets in the 5th Fleet 
area of responsibility dated from March 1, 2011 to August 31, 2011, based on requisition 
order date.  The data included 76 variables for each shipment.  For this study, the five 
columns of interest are POD, RDD, Date Shipped, Date POD Received, Date POD 
Shipped, and Date Received. 
 POD – Port of Debarkation, last port through which requisitioned material 
passes prior to delivery to requisitioning activity. 
 RDD – Required Delivery Date assigns a three digit code based on the 
Julian date of the delivery requirement. For material meeting the criteria 
for a critical requirement, an RDD of 999 is assigned, and for material not 
meeting critical criteria but still requiring expedited shipping, an RDD of 
777 is assigned  ().  For the purpose of this study, we have broken the 
RDDs into three categories; 999, 777, and Other, or all RDDs not meeting 
the 999 or 777 criteria.  
 Date Shipped – Date requisitioned material physically shipped from its 
point of origin.  
 Date POD Received – Date requisitioned material was received at the 
POD. 
 Date POD Shipped – Date requisitioned material was shipped from the 
POD. 
 Date Received – Date requisitioned material was received by 
requisitioning guide. 
The original dataset included 37,781 requisitions.  Of the original data, 
approximately 26% were removed prior to analysis.  The set was refined by eliminating 
data that were missing information, erroneous, or beyond the scope of the study.  Because 
such a large percentage of the data had to be removed, histograms were developed to 
display any trends that may have appeared relating the missing and erroneous data to the 
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location of the POD, or the priority assigned.  While there were some differences in the 
percentage of removed data in relation to POD location or priority, no difference was 
great enough to suggest a bias.  The histograms are provided in Figures 13 and 14.   
 
 
Figure 13.  Percentage of Erroneous or Missing Data by POD Location 
 
 
Figure 14.  Percentage of Erroneous or Missing Data by Assigned Priority 
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Missing information was primarily missing POD ship dates, most likely due to 
inconsistent manual data entry procedures at Naval forward logistics sites.  Analysis of 
these procedures was deemed beyond the scope of this study and the data were removed.  
Data with a requisitioning activity location other than 5th Fleet were also deemed to be 
beyond the scope of the study and were removed.  Some data were deemed erroneous 
because of negative processing or shipping times, and were removed.  These data were 
then sorted into four subsets based on location of POD.  Table 3.1 provides the location 
of the PODs.   
 
 
Table 1.   Air Terminal Identifier Codes (Defense Transportation Regulation, 2008)  
These four subsets were analyzed individually to avoid any variability arising 
directly from varying shipping times to the different POD geographic locations. 
B. MATERIAL FLOW MAPPING 
This study examined both the physical flow of material into and through the 5th 
Fleet area of operation as well as the numerical data provided by the NAVSUP Logistics 
Operations Center.  The routes and methods used to move material through the region are 
necessarily dynamic due to the changing location of the requisitioning activity, and are 
therefore not standardized.  Providing a visual material flow map helps readers to more 
easily understand a complex and highly variable supply distribution system.  Interviews 
were conducted with experts from NAVSUP, CTF-53, and the NAVSUP Logistics 
Operation Center to assist in mapping the material flow that illustrated commonly used 
transportation methods, material shipping routes, transportation hubs, forward logistics 
sites, and the limitations and capabilities associated with each level of the material flow.  
The material flow diagram was used to determine transportation options and visibility at 
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decision points at various stages in the supply chain.  With the visual flow map, issues 
critical to this study such as limitations in material visibility and key decision points can 
be more easily recognized. 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
For the preliminary data analysis, the data were sorted three times into subsets, by 
segment of the supply chain, and by shipping priority.  The first sorting was into four 
subsets based on POD location - BAH, FJR, JIB, and ZIF.  Within each of these subsets, 
the data were sorted again by segment of the supply chain – shipping origin location to 
POD and POD to the location of material requisitioning activity. 
 
 
Figure 15.  Two Segment Supply Chain Division 
The final sort criterion for the data was shipping priority.  The shipping priority 
was defined by the RDD in three categories - 999 for the highest priority material 
requisitions, 777 for material to be expedited but not meeting 999 criteria, and Other for 
any material requisitions not meeting criteria required for 999 or 777 RDDs. 
 
 
Figure 16.  Shipping Priority Within Supply Chain Segment 
After sorting the data, Microsoft Excel was used to produce the preliminary 
statistics of mean, standard deviation, sample variance, and count for the 24 possible 
iterations encompassed by the scope of this study.  For each port of debarkation (POD) 
and supply chain segment, the mean and standard deviations of each shipping priority 
were compared to determine the general relationships of the material shipping times of 
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each shipping priority.  This comparison was done for both segments of the supply chain, 
shipping time from origin to POD and shipping time from POD to the requisitioning 
activity.  The expectation was that material requisitions with higher priority would ship 
faster and with lower variability than requisitions with lower priority for both segments 
of the supply chain within the scope of this study.  In addition to the preliminary 
statistics, the data were used to build a histogram for each POD location depicting the 
number of requisitions and shipping times in days.  To build the histograms, bins of one 
day were used for shipping times, and the number of requisitions counted for each 
shipping time, from 1–200 days.  To make a visual comparison of the data in each POD 
histogram, the data were normalized and the histograms presented as the percentage of 
each type of requisition in each segment of the supply chain for each POD. 
The descriptive statistics for Bahrain show mean shipping times from shipping to 
POD as within 2.5 days of each other, with the 999 priority shipping being the fastest 
with a mean and standard deviation of 4.6 and 4.2 days respectively, the 777 priority with 
the second fastest with mean and standard deviation of 6.4 and 7.3 days, and the Other 
with the slowest transit mean and standard deviation of 6.9 and 10.7 days.  These results 
follow the expected trends for both the mean and standard deviation.  From POD to 
receipt, the 999 priority had the fastest mean of 7.2 days, the Other priority was second 
with a mean of 8.3 days, and the 777 priority was slowest with a mean of 10.8 days.  The 
standard deviations for the three priorities were similar and ranged from 14.2 to 15.4 
days.  While the standard deviations were similar to what was expected, the mean transit 
times did not follow the expected trend with the 777 priority shipping more slowly than 
the regular priority.  The preliminary statistics for material requisitions with a POD of 
Bahrain are found in Table 2, and the histograms for Bahrain are found in Figure 17.   
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Figure 17.  POD Bahrain Shipping Times 
The descriptive statistics for Fujairah show mean shipping times from shipping to 
POD with the 999 priority shipping as the fastest with a mean and standard deviation of 
9.2 and 8.9 days, the 777 priority with the second fastest with mean and standard 
deviation of 12.9 and 13.8 days, and the Other with the slowest transit mean and greatest 
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standard deviation of 29.4 and 31.6 days.  Both the mean and standard deviation for 
transit times from shipping to POD followed the expected trends for each priority.  From 
POD to receipt, the 777 and Other priorities had similar means of 8.8 days and standard 
deviations of 11.2 days for 777 and 12.8 for Other.  The 999 priority had the slowest 
mean transit time of 13.8 days and greatest standard deviation of 16.8 days.  These 
findings are unexpected as the highest priority material was shipped with the slowest 
mean time and had the greatest variability.  The preliminary statistics for material 
requisitions with a POD of Fujairah are found in Table 3, and the histograms for Fujairah 
are found in Figure 18. 
 
 





Figure 18.  Fujairah Shipping Times 
The descriptive statistics for Djibouti show that priority 999 material had the 
fastest mean transit time and smallest standard deviation from ship to POD of 6.8 and 4.1 
days.  Priority 777 material was second with mean and standard deviation of 7.6 and 4.8 
days, and Other material was the slowest with the greatest standard deviation of 9.8 and 
10.2 days.  The mean and standard deviation trends for requisitions moving from 
shipping to POD followed expectations for all priorities.  Shipping transit times from 
POD to receipt followed expected trends with the 999 priority as the fastest with mean 
and standard deviation of 8.1 and 11.6 days.  The 777 priority was second with mean and 
standard deviation of 9.4 and 14.2 days.  The Other priority was slowest with a mean and 
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standard deviation of 9.5 and 13.1 days. The descriptive statistics for material requisitions 
with a POD of Djibouti are found in Table 4, and the histograms are found in Figure 19. 
 
 





Figure 19.  Djibouti Shipping Times 
The descriptive statistics for Jebel Ali showed that from ship to POD, items with 
999 priority have the fastest transit time and smallest standard deviation, 10.2 and 12.7 
days respectively.  The 777 priority was second in both mean and standard deviation with 
12.9 and 16.6 days.  Items with Other priority had the slowest transit time mean and 
greatest standard deviation of 29.3 and 26.8 days.  Material requisitions shipped from 
POD to receipt did not follow expected behavior as the oOther priority had the fastest 
mean transit time of 8.7 with a standard deviation of 12.6 days.  The 777 priority was 
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second fastest with a mean of 7.8 and a standard deviation of 10.7 days.  The highest 
priority 999 material was the slowest with a mean of 9.9 and a standard deviation of 13 
days.  The descriptive statistics for material requisitions with a POD of Jebel Ali are 
found in Table 5, and the histograms for Jebel Ali are found in Figure 20. 
 
 





Figure 20.  Jebel Ali Shipping Times 
B. T-STATISTIC ANALYSIS 
While a cursory comparison between the means of a given POD and segment of 
the supply chain gives some impression of the relationship of shipping times and priority, 
legitimate comparisons can only be made when statistical significance is established.  
Each of the three priorities were compared with one another: Other – 777, Other – 999, 
and 777 -999.  Once these relationships were established for each of the two segments of 
the supply chain, the segments were then compared to one another.  For instance, the 
“Other – 777” test statistic from the “Ship to POD” segment of the supply chain was 
compared to the “Other – 777” test statistic from the “POD to Received” segment of the 
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supply chain.  The comparison between these statistics demonstrates the variability in 
supply chain performance and variability between the two segments, the first segment, 
Ship to POD, where visibility exists, and the second, POD to received, where visibility is 
not present.  To compare each of the three priorities across the two segments of the 
supply chain for each of the four PODs, 24 t-tests had to be conducted; six for each of the 
four PODs.  The t-statistic measures the difference between two sample means by using 
the sample mean x  the sample variance s^2, and the sample size n.  To compare the 
population means of two given priorities along a segment of the supply chain, the two 
means are first assumed to be equal, meaning that the null hypothesis is 
 
 Significant deviation from the null hypothesis would suggest that the alternative 
hypothesis were true, or  
 
If the alternative hypothesis is correct, then it can be concluded two compared 
priority shipments have different means. 
Before the test statistic was calculated, the rejection region had to be determined 
using a given confidence interval and the number of degrees of freedom of the test 
statistic.  The confidence interval used for this study was 95%.  This corresponds to 
, or  for each of the tests.  The unequal sample variance t-test is best 
represented by the Student-t distribution.  The Student-t distribution looks similar to the 
normal distribution, but differs in that the variance of a standard normal random variable 
is 1, and the variance of a Student-t random variable is given by , where  is the 
number of degrees of freedom of the distribution and determines the distribution’s 
dispersion.  The greater the value of the number of degrees of freedom, the narrower the 
Student-t distribution becomes, and approaches the standard normal distribution.  The 
number of degrees of freedom ( ) is a function of the sample’s variances and the 
sample size .  The following equation represents the number of degrees of freedom of 
the test statistic: 
 35
 
Once the confidence interval and the number of degrees of freedom were 
determined, the rejection region was defined using the t-distribution table, which assigns 
a t-value ( based on the confidence level and degree of freedom inputs.  A t-
statistic ( ) falling below the negative t-value (  or above the positive t-value 
( falls in the rejection region.  When the t-statistic falls within the rejection 
region, it can be concluded that the two means being compared are different. The 
rejection region is given by 
 or   
For each of the 24 t-tests, results varied for the number of degrees of freedom, , 
but each value of the rejection region fell between  and .  To 
determine the test statistic, the previously calculated descriptive statistics of the sample 
mean  the sample variance , and the sample size  was used.  The value of the test 
statistic, assuming unequal variances, is given by 
 
The sample variances given by the descriptive statistics provided sufficient 
evidence to assume unequal population variances.  If the value of the test statistic fell 
outside the rejection region, it could be said that with 95% confidence, the alternative 
hypothesis was correct, and the means of the two distributions were not equal.  For this 
study, unequal means between two given shipping priorities translates to one of those 
priorities shipping faster than the other, on average. 
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C. T-TEST ANALYSIS RESULTS 
After performing the t-test on each priority combination at each segment and 
POD, the tests of corresponding segment pairs were compared to determine the degree of 
transit time similarity based upon a requisition’s priority.  For instance, a t-stat of 5.0 
between priority 777 and 999 from point of origin to POD would suggest that the time to 
ship material to that particular POD is statistically faster for materials with high priority.  
However, if the t-statistic comparing the shipping time from the POD to the destination is 
1.0, it would suggest that the time to ship from the POD to the destination is not 
statistically different, whether it is shipped with high priority or not. 
All of the test statistic values for Bahrain fell in the rejection region, suggesting 
that the mean shipping times between the different priorities were statistically different in 
all cases except one.  Notably, it was shown that in one instance, from the POD to the 
destination, the 777 priority shipped slower on average than the Other priority.  The 
values for the Other – 777 priority test statistics were 2.54 coming in to the POD, and -
6.37 going out of the POD.  This means that priority 777 material shipped faster to the 
POD, and the priority Other material shipped faster from the POD.  The values for the 
Other – 999 priority test statistics were 11.94 coming into the POD, and 2.40 going out of 
the POD.  This means that priority 999 material shipped faster in both segments of the 
supply chain, and the difference in shipping speeds was more pronounced going into the 
POD.  The values for the 777 – 999 priority test statistics were 14.42 coming into the 
POD, and 8.74 going out of the POD.  This means that priority 999 material shipped 
faster in both segments of the supply chain, and the difference in shipping speeds was 
more pronounced going into the POD.  Generally, the variability of the means coming in 
to the POD was much greater than the variability going out of the POD.  The test statistic 
values for Bahrain are given in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6.   Bahrain Test Statistics 
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All but one of the test statistic values for Fujairah fell within the rejection region, 
suggesting that the mean shipping times between the different priorities were statistically 
different in all cases except one.  Two of the priority comparisons, both from the POD to 
the destination, showed that both the 777 and Other priorities shipped faster than the 
highest 999 priority.  The values for the Other – 777 test statistics were 17.35 coming into 
the POD, and 0.11 going out of the POD.  This means the priority 777 material shipped 
faster coming into the POD, but both priorities shipped with the same speed going out of 
the POD.  The values for the Other – 999 test statistics were 20.62 coming into the POD, 
and -3.96 going out of the POD.  This means the priority 999 material came into the POD 
faster, but went out slower than the lower priority Other.  The values for the 777 – 999 
test statistics were 5.74 coming into the POD, and -4.05 going out of the POD.  This 
means the priority 999 material came into the POD faster, but went out slower than the 
lower priority 777.  The test statistic values for Fujairah are given in Table 7. 
 
 
Table 7.   Fujairah Test Statistics 
 
All but one of the test statistic values for Djibouti fell within the rejection region, 
suggesting that the mean shipping times between the different priorities were statistically 
different in all cases except one.  In all comparisons, the higher priority was shipped 
faster than the lower priority.  The values for the Other – 777 test statistics were 11.12 
coming into the POD, and 0.13 going out of the POD.  This means the priority 777 
material shipped faster coming into the POD, but both priorities shipped with the same 
speed going out of the POD.  The values for the Other – 999 test statistics were 14.54 
coming into the POD, and 2.80 going out of the POD.  This means the priority 999 
material came into and went out of the POD faster.  The values for the 777 – 999 test 
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statistics were 8.77 coming into the POD, and 3.20 going out of the POD.  This means 
the priority 999 material came into and went out of the POD faster.  The variability of the 
means coming in to the POD was much greater than the variability going out of the POD.  
The test statistic values for Djibouti are given in Table 8 
 
 
Table 8.   Djibouti Test Statistics  
 
All but two of the test statistic values for Jebel Ali fell within the rejection region, 
suggesting that the mean shipping times between the different priorities were statistically 
different in all cases except two.  As with Fujairah, the highest 999 priority was 
determined to be the slowest of the three priorities from the POD to the destination.  The 
values for the Other – 777 test statistics were 23.50 coming into the POD, and 1.65 going 
out of the POD.  This means the priority 777 material shipped faster coming into the 
POD, but both priorities shipped with the same speed going out of the POD.  The values 
for the Other – 999 test statistics were 22.29 coming into the POD, and -1.26 going out of 
the POD.  This means the priority 999 material came into the POD faster, but went out 
slower than the lower priority Other.  The values for the 777 – 999 test statistics were 
3.34 coming into the POD, and -2.15 going out of the POD.  This means the priority 999 
material came into the POD faster, but went out slower than the lower priority 777.  
Generally, the variability of the means coming in to the POD was much greater than the 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
A.  SUPPLY CHAIN FROM ORIGIN TO POD 
As would be expected in a properly functioning supply chain, material flowing 
into all Fifth Fleet PODs, on average, arrives faster if it is ordered with the highest 
shipping priority, 999.  The next lower shipping priority, 777, arrives on average, the 
second fastest.  Finally, material with an RDD other than 999 or 777, arrives, on average 
slowest.  Where significant, the t-tests show that with 95% confidence we can say the 
differences in shipping time between priorities are statistically significant, meaning it is 
unlikely that we are observing performance differences resulting from chance.  We see 
the supply chain up to the PODs is functioning correctly with regards to shipping 
priorities. 
 
POD 999 777 Other
Bahrain (BAH) 4.62 6.43 6.94
Fujairah (FJR) 9.20 12.89 29.37
Djibouti (JIB) 6.77 7.60 9.83
Jebel Ali (ZJF) 10.18 12.93 29.34
Mean Shipping Times to POD
 
Table 10.   Mean Shipping Times to POD 
 
B. SUPPLY CHAIN FROM POD TO END USER 
Material shipping from the PODs to the end user does not follow what would be 
expected in a properly functioning supply chain.  The departure from expected results 
indicates there is a breakdown in the supply system at some point after arrival at the 
POD.  Only in Djibouti do the average shipping times follow the expected result, but 
even then, 777 and Other are statistically indistinguishable.   
The fact that every POD produced different results may indicate a difference in 
the material handling processes used at each location.  It may also indicate that 
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peculiarities in each location (geographic position, manning, etc.) affect the materials’ 
shipping times. 
The breakdown of how assigned priorities ship could be caused by a variety of 
reasons.  Material routing by CTF-53 may not consider the RDDs.  The material handling 
processes at the PODs may not consider the RDDs.  There may be other reasons that 
account for these results that remain hidden because the lack of visibility causes a lack of 
analyzable data. 
 
POD 999 777 Other
Bahrain (BAH) 7.24 10.80 8.33
Fujairah (FJR) 13.78 8.79 8.85
Djibouti (JIB) 8.09 9.43 9.48
Jebel Ali (ZJF) 9.91 7.84 8.69
Mean Shipping Times from POD to End User
 
Table 11.   Mean Shipping Times from POD to End User 
 
C. LIMITATIONS 
There are several factors that may affect the conclusions of this study.  The effect 
they may have on the study’s results bear mentioning. 
The backorder of material would increase the time it takes for an item to arrive at 
the POD.  If a particular priority tended to be backordered more frequently the results 
would be skewed.  This was accounted for by calculating origin to POD by the date 
shipped from origin not the date ordered.  By using only the in-transit time, the effect of 
backorders was effectively removed. 
Items ordered under a particular priority may be inherently more difficult to ship 
due to bulk, weight, origination, etc.  However, the priority is assigned based on the 
criticality of its effect to mission readiness.  An item ordered with an RDD of 999 may be 
subsequently ordered under an RDD of 777 or Other based on how that particular item 
affects the mission at that time.  If certain items were inherently more difficult to ship we 
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would expect to see those effects on material shipping to the POD as well as out of the 
POD, which we did not. 
Because 26% of the original data was discarded due to illogical shipping dates or 
missing data, it can be assumed that some of the data used for analysis was also 
corrupted.  The discarded data was found to be evenly distributed between supply chain 
segments, PODs and priorities, so there is no reason to suspect that any other corrupted 
data would skew this study’s results. 
Although material is assigned a priority by the requisitioning activity, decisions 
made by CTF-53 have a great effect of the speed of delivery.  It can be assumed units 
performing critical missions would have an implicitly high priority on their material than 
units preparing to depart the AOR.  While this study did not look at individual units nor 
their taskings, given the volume of data analyzed, we believe that any preference given to 
units based on their tasking would be outliers and not affect our analysis. 
As the same data were used in multiple comparisons (for example, the 777 
shipping times from Bahrain were compared to both the 999 and Other shipping times in 
two separate comparisons), the t-tests should have been multiple-comparison protected 
(Hochberg & Tamhane, 1987).  However, given the magnitude of differences observed, 
and the resulting large t-statistic, it is unlikely a multiple comparison correction would 
have changed a significant t-test result to one of no significance. 
Finally, this study assumed that the reported date received was the same as 
physical receipt onboard.  Unit personnel manually input material receipts and there is no 
way to know if this assumption is correct. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  For Further Study 
An effective cost-benefit analysis cannot be preformed until more light is shed on 
why the assigned RDD priorities breakdown post-POD arrival.  However, we do not 
believe there is any evidence that full-scale implementation of initiatives to increase 
visibility past the PODs would be cost effective.  This is due to the lack of shipping 
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options once a final POD is decided upon.  Once material departs the POD, the final 
mode of delivery (UNREP ship, COD, etc.) has been determined.  This causes delivery 
time to be largely inflexible. 
Further study into the issues presented is warranted to uncover their root causes.  
We propose the following: 
a. POD Processes 
To fully understand why material ships differently than expected from the 
PODs, an operations management analysis of the material handling processes at each 
POD should be conducted.  Further study should include comparisons of material 
handling processes at each POD, specifically as they apply to the various shipping 
priorities of material.  This should lead to uncovering best practices, which could be 
applied to the other PODs.  By also analyzing and comparing each POD’s workload, 
manpower and resources process improvements may present themselves. 
b. Earlier Material Routing 
Roughly half of the transit time from origin to end-user occurs prior to 
arrival at the POD.  Due the decrease in shipping options as material flows further down 
the supply chain, relevant decisions should be made as early as possible to ensure the 
most expeditious and efficient system.  We recommend a study to investigate pushing 
material routing decisions earlier than is currently done. 
Another possibility would be to use commercially available material 
routing software.  This software is used by civilian sector businesses to optimize the 
efficiency of their supply chains. 
2. Increased/Improved Visibility 
At some point between arrival at the POD and receipt by the end user, the 
assigned RDD ceases to be an effective predictor of performance.  If POD processes are 
found to be sufficient and earlier routing either infeasible or ineffective, the only way to  
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diagnose problems will be through a clear understanding of what occurs after material 
leaves the POD.  This will necessitate expanding in-transit visibility into the last nautical 
mile. 
Additionally, there is a need for improved reliability in the visibility data.  Nearly 
30% of the raw data received for this study had to be discarded.  In some cases, material 
was reported to be received before it was shipped, both from origin and POD.  In other 
cases data was simply not reported.  Data was discarded less often between the origin and 
POD than between the POD and end user.  This is more than likely the result of 
automated tracking prior to the last nautical mile. 
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Table 12.   Bahrain Descriptive Statistics 
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Table 15.   Jebel Ali Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Table 16.   T-Test Results Other – 777 Ship to POD Bahrain 
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Table 17.   T-Test Results Other – 777 POD to Received Bahrain 
 
 
Table 18.   T-Test Results Other – 999 Ship to POD Bahrain 
 
 




Table 20.   T-Test Results 777 – 999 Ship to POD Bahrain 
 
 
Table 21.   T-Test Results 777 – 999 POD to Received Bahrain 
 
 
Table 22.   T-Test Results Other – 777 Ship to POD Fujairah 
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Table 23.   T-Test Results Other – 777 POD to Received Fujairah 
 
 
Table 24.   T-Test Results Other – 999 Ship to POD Fujairah 
 
 




Table 26.   T-Test Results 777 - 999 Ship to POD Fujairah 
 
 
Table 27.   T-Test Results 777 - 999 POD to Received Fujairah 
 
 




Table 29.   T-Test Results Other – 777 POD to Received Djibouti 
 
 
Table 30.   T-Test Results Other – 999 Ship to POD Djibouti 
 
 




Table 32.   T-Test Results 777 - 999 Ship to POD Djibouti 
 
 
Table 33.   T-Test Results 777 - 999 POD to Received Djibouti 
 
 




Table 35.   T-Test Results Other – 777 POD to Received Jebel Ali 
 
 
Table 36.   T-Test Results Other – 999 Ship to POD Jebel Ali 
 
 




Table 38.   T-Test Results 777 - 999 Ship to POD Jebel Ali 
 
 
Table 39.   T-Test Results 777 - 999 POD to Received Jebel Ali 
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